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On March 18, 1999, Vernon Woods placed a 911 call after his 
five-week-old son, who suffered from cerebral palsy, became 
unresponsive.1 The infant died six months later.2 One possible 
explanation for the infant’s death, which the deputy medical examiner 
would have testified to at trial, was that he died from water on the 
brain as a result of blunt force head trauma.3 Woods claimed, 
however, that he accidentally dropped the baby and shook him “in an
effort to revive him.”
 
distribute.    
                                                
4 Woods pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter 
in 2001.5 Woods already had a 1993 conviction for possession of 
cocaine with intent to 6
On November 16, 2007, Woods was again before the court for 
two counts of distributing ecstasy and one count of possession of a 
weapon by a felon.7 The district court found Woods to be a career 
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offender, and sentenced him to 192 months of imprisonment.8 On 
appeal, Woods challenged his sentence, claiming that the involuntary 
manslaughter conviction was not a “crime of violence” within the 
meaning of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG” or “the 
Guidelines”).9 In a surprising result, the Seventh Circuit agreed.10 
Accordingly, the court found that Woods was not a career offender 
under the Guidelines, and reduced his 192-month sentence to a mere 
84 months.11 
How can such a result make sense? In other words, as the dissent 
in Woods argued, how can homicide not be a violent felony?12 As this 
article will demonstrate, the answer lies in the line of sentencing cases 
the United States Supreme Court has recently decided.13 In particular, 
the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Begay that a predicate 
offense has to be “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” in order to be 
considered for sentence enhancement (the “Begay test”).14 While each 
of the elements in the Begay test requires its own analysis, such 
considerations are beyond the scope of this article. Instead, this article 
will focus on the first requirement, purposefulness.  
In looking at the mens rea of Illinois’s involuntary manslaughter 
statute, the Seventh Circuit came to the conclusion that Woods had not 
acted purposefully when he caused the death of his son.15 In other 
words, the court held that, because Woods was convicted under a 
statute that only required a mens rea of recklessness, his conduct was 
not purposeful.16   
The question then becomes whether a defendant who acts under a 
mens rea of recklessness can ever be considered to have acted 
                                                 
8 Id. at 402. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 413. 
11 Id. at 401.  
12 Id. at 414 (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting).  
13 See generally Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009); Begay v. 
United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007); 
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005). 
14 128 S. Ct. at 1586.  
15 Woods, 576 F.3d at 411.  
16 Id. at 412–413. 
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purposefully. While the answer may seem obvious at first glance, a 
review of the existing case law reveals that the question is much more 
convoluted than one might first surmise.17 This article explores 
different approaches courts have taken when analyzing whether a prior 
conviction was purposeful under the Begay test. Ultimately, it 
concludes that the Seventh Circuit’s approach to purposefulness, while 
grounded in solid legal reasoning, is incompatible with the goals of the 
Guidelines and should be abandoned.18   
Part I of this article provides the necessary background on 
sentencing enhancements. First, it considers the legislative history of 
the Armed Career Criminal Act (the “ACCA”) and the USSG to 
determine the goals of the two provisions.19 Then, the article reviews 
the Court’s decisions that have interpreted the “violent felony” or 
“crime of violence” phrase of the ACCA and USSG. Next, it provides 
an in-depth examination of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in U.S. v. 
Woods. Part II compares the Seventh Circuit’s approach to analyzing 
purposefulness to the approaches adopted by the other federal circuits. 
Finally, Part III argues that a mens rea approach to purposefulness 
defeats Congress’s goals of neutralizing violent, repeat offenders and 
enhancing uniformity in sentencing. This article concludes that judges 
should have more discretion to consult the record of conviction during 
                                                 
17 See discussion infra Part II.  
18 See discussion infra Part III.  
19 While there are differences between the USSG and the ACCA, the similarity 
in language between the two provisions led courts to hold that an interpretation of 
one is also applicable to the other. See, e.g., James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 
206 (2007) (noting that “definition of a predicate ‘crime of violence’ closely tracks 
ACCA’s definition of ‘violent felony.’”); United States v. Daye, 571 F.3d 225, 236 
(2d Cir. 2009) (court used case law interpreting § 4B.1 to support its interpretation of 
ACCA); United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2009) (court 
used prior decision interpreting a crime of violence under the Guidelines to support 
interpretation of ACCA); United States v. Johnson, 417 F.3d 990, 996–97 (8th Cir. 
2005), abrogated on other grounds by Begay, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (“The statutory 
definition of ‘violent felony’ is viewed as interchangeable with the guidelines 
definition of ‘crime of violence.’ Therefore, in determining whether a defendant 
qualifies as an armed career criminal under the ACCA, we are also bound by case 
law defining a crime of violence under § 4B1.2.”). 
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A. The History of the ACCA and USSG 
 
Although this article treats the USSG and the ACCA as one and 
the same for the purposes of statutory interpretation, it is important to 
note the differences between the two with regard to their creation, 
functions, and overall purpose. Understanding the goals behind the 
creation of the USSG and the ACCA will help when determining 
whether the Seventh Circuit reached the right decision in Woods.   
 
1. The Armed Career Criminal Act 
 
The ACCA is a federal statute that requires an automatic 15 year 
minimum sentence for anyone who violates 18 U.S.C. 922(g)20 and 
has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug 
offenses.21 As opposed to the Guidelines, the ACCA is specifically 
concerned with the “special danger” posed by career criminals 
carrying guns.22 
Congress passed the ACCA in 1984 as part of an overall revamp 
of federal criminal legislation during the Reagan administration.23 
This movement was inspired by research that had come out of the 
1970s and 1980s that demonstrated that a large number of crimes were 
                                                 
20 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is the statute that prohibits certain individuals such as 
convicted felons, illegal aliens, and military personnel discharged under 
dishonorable conditions from transporting or possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g) (2006).  
21 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).  
22 United States v. Sylvester, 620 F. Supp. 2d 642, 649 n.3 (M.D. Pa. 2009) 
(citing Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581, 1587 (2008)).  
23 See Tracey A. Basler, Note, Does “Any” Mean “All” or Does “Any” Mean 
“Some”? An Analysis of the “Any Court” Ambiguity of the Armed Career Criminal 
Act and Whether Foreign Convictions Count as Predicate Convictions, 37 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 147, 173–74 (2002).  
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committed by a small group of repeat offenders.24 Thus, the goal 
behind the ACCA was “[to] incapacitate the truly dangerous 
criminal.”25  
Senator Specter originally introduced the Career Criminal Life 
Sentence Act, the predecessor to the ACCA, in 1981.26 In its original 
form, the Career Criminal Life Sentence Act authorized the federal 
prosecution of a criminal defendant accused of committing a robbery 
or burglary who had already been convicted twice for robbery or 
burglary under state law.27 The Career Criminal Life Sentence Act 
was vetoed in 1983 due to federalism concern 28s.  
                                                
The bill was reintroduced in 1984 and Congressman William 
Hughes, then-Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, proposed an 
amendment that would allow the bill to be approved: 
 
Congressman Hughes’s amendment significantly changed the 
legislation. To address the federalism concerns, it eliminated 
the creation of federal jurisdiction over local robberies and 
burglaries by repeat offenders. Instead of expanding federal 
jurisdiction, the amendment created a sentence enhancement 
for repeat offenders convicted of violating a preexisting 
federal law. More specifically, the amendment created a 
mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years or 
imprisonment for offenders previously convicted three of 
more times of robbery or burglary who violate the federal law 
prohibiting felons from possessing, receiving, or transporting 
firearms. The subcommittee accepted this amendment, and 
the amended bill was passed into law as the Armed Career 
Criminal Act of 1984.29  
 
24 James G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 
545 (2009).  
25 134 CONG. REC. 15, 806–07 (1988) (statement of Sen. Specter).  
26 Levine, supra note 24, at 546. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 546–47. 
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Thus, in 1984 the primary concern of Congress was to 
“incapacitate career criminals” which was done by targeting those 
individuals who frequently robbed or burglarized.30 The violent felony 
provision was not added until 1986, which “allowed for incapacitating 
a wider variety of career criminals than just robbers and burglars” by 
adding more crimes that would qualify as predicate offenses.31 
Ultimately, then, it can be concluded that one of the primary purposes 
behind the ACCA was to keep violent, repeat offenders off the streets.  
 
2. The United States Sentencing Guidelines 
 
The Guidelines are standards set forth by the United States 
Sentencing Commission (“the Commission”) that district courts use 
when sentencing offenders.32 Although the Guidelines are advisory, a 
sentencing court must properly apply the Guidelines before imposing a 
sentence on the defendant.33 
Under USSG §4B1.1, a defendant can be deemed a career 
offender if (1) he was 18 at the time he committed the offense for 
which he is being sentenced (2) the offense for which he is being 
sentenced is either a crime of violence or a controlled substances 
offense and (3) he or she has two prior convictions for crimes of 
violence or controlled substances offenses.34 Thus, the Guidelines 
differ from the ACCA in that only two prior convictions are needed 
for sentence enhancement and the crime before the court must be 
either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, as 
opposed to a violation of the firearm statute.35  
                                                 
30 Id. at 547. 
31 Id. 
32 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 2 (2009).  
33 See id.; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005).  
34 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (2009). 
35 Compare id. with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006). 
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Prior to the adoption of the Guidelines, judges had wide 
discretion with regard to sentencing.36 This was, in part, because 
sentencing was based on a “medical” model where sentences were 
supposed to be “individualized,” like medical treatment, so that a 
criminal defendant’s particular social disability could be treated.37 
However, this individualized model fell out of favor as a result of 
“rising crime, mounting evidence that prisoners were not being 
rehabilitated, and increasing concern that indeterminate sentencing 
produced unjust disparities between similarly situated offenders.”38 
As opposed to the ACCA, which Congress created, the 
Commission creates and updates the Guidelines.39 The Commission 
was created pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“the 
SRA”).40 Congress decided to create this agency because “(1) the 
previously unfettered sentencing discretion accorded federal trial 
judges needed to be structured; (2) the administration of punishment 
needed to be more certain; and (3) specific offenders (e.g. white collar 
and violent, repeat offenders) needed to be targeted for more serious 
penalties.”41  
The Commission is “an independent agency in the judicial branch 
of government.”42 It is charged with: 
 
(1) establish[ing] sentencing policies and practices for the 
Federal criminal justice system that— 
(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing. . .43  
                                                 
36 See Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical 
Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. REV. 83, 89 (1988).  
37 Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A 
Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1321 (2005).  
38 Id. at 1322.  
39 See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2–3 
http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2009). 
40 Id. at 1. 
41 Id. at 1–2. 
42 Id. at 1. 
43 The goals of sentencing are just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2) (2006). 
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(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of 
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities 
among defendants with similar records who have been found 
guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining 
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when 
warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into 
account in the establishment of general sentencing practices; 
and 
(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in 
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal 
justice process.44 
 
The first set of sentencing guidelines went into effect November 
1, 1987.45 The most recent amendments to the guidelines went into 
effect November 1, 2009.46 
Overall, then, the purpose of the Guidelines was to increase 
uniformity in sentencing and, like the ACCA, increase the punishment 
for repeat offenders. However, in sentencing defendants under the 
Guidelines, federal courts must also be mindful of the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of “violent felony” or “crime of violence.”    
 
B. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the “Violent Felony” or 
“Crime of Violence” Definition 
 
Both the ACCA and the USSG define a “violent felony” or a 
“crime of violence” as one that “(1) has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of force against the person of another, 
or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves the use of 
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious 
                                                 
44 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b) (West 2008). 
45 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED 
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 2, 
http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2009). 
46 United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
Manuals, http://www.ussc.gov/guidelin.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).  
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potential risk of physical injury to another.”47 Because the language of 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) and § 4B1.2(a) is identical, courts have 
considered case law interpreting one statutory provision to be a 
persuasive, if not binding, interpretation of the other.48 
In United States v. Taylor, the Court confronted the problem of 
defining burglary for purposes of sentence enhancement under the 
ACCA.49 In Taylor, the Supreme Court held that courts should adopt a 
“categorical approach” when sentencing a defendant, meaning that 
courts should not consider the individual facts of a defendant’s crime 
but should only look at the fact that a conviction occurred and the 
elements of the offense.50 However, the Taylor Court modified this 
categorical approach by recognizing that, in certain cases, a sentencing 
court would be permitted to consult the record of conviction for 
purposes of sentence enhancement.51   
Shepard v. United States refined this analysis by limiting the 
modified categorical approach.52 In Shepard, the issue was whether a 
sentencing court could consult police reports and complaint 
applications for purposes of applying the sentence enhancement under 
the ACCA.53 The Court held that the sentencing court may only 
consult “the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea 
agreement or transcript of a colloquy between judge and defendant in 
which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or 
to some comparable judicial record of this information.”54 The Court 
reasoned that to hold otherwise would undermine Taylor and would 
lead collateral trials taking place during the sentencing phase of a 
trial.55 
                                                 
47 18 U.S.C § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 4B1.2(a) (2009).  
48 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
49 See 495 U.S. 575, 578 (1990). 
50 Id. at 602.  
51 See id. 
52 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005). 
53 Id. at 16. 
54 Id. at 26. 
55 Id. at 23. 
 79
9
Schackart: Finding Intent Without <em>Mens Rea</em>: A Modified Categorical
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 5, Issue 1                            Fall 2009 
In James v. United States, the Court specifically focused on the 
“residual clause” of the ACCA and USSG.56 In James, the question 
before the Court was whether attempted burglary presented enough of 
a serious potential risk of physical injury to qualify as a violent felony 
under the ACCA.57 Using the categorical approach, the Court 
reasoned that the risk present in a burglary “arises not from the 
completion of the burglary, but from the possibility that an innocent 
person might appear while the crime is in progress.”58 Thus, attemp












whether a felony offense for driving under the influence of alcohol 
                                                
lary.59  
The defendant in James responded by arguing that under th
categorical approach, attempted burglary should not count as a 
predicate offense “unless all cases [of attempted burglary] present 
such a risk.”60 While the Court acknowledged that some instance
attempted burglary did not present a risk of physical harm to the 
innocent victim, such as the burglary of an abandoned building, the 
Court stressed the “ACCA does not require metaphysical certainty.
Rather, §924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s residual provision speaks in terms o
‘potential risk.’ These are inherently probabilistic concepts.”61 
Consequently, James stood for the proposition that a crime can qua
as a predicate offense under the ACCA’s residual clause if “by 
re” the crime involved serious potential risk to another.62  
One year later, the Court decided Begay v. United States, where
again considered whether an offense was a violent felony under the
residual clause of the ACCA.63 Specifically, the Court determined 
 
56 550 U.S. 192, 197 (2007). The residual clause is that part of the ACCA and 
USSG that punishes crimes that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury or harm.” Id.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 203.  
59 Id. at 203–04. 
60 Id. at 207 (emphasis in original).  
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 209. 
63 128 S. Ct. 1581, 1584–85 (2008). 
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(DUI) posed the same degree of physical risk to an individual as 
burglary, arson, extortion, or the use of explosives.64  
In reaching its conclusion that a DUI was not a violent felony 
under the ACCA, the Court acknowledged that there was no doubt that 
driving under the influence presented a serious physical risk to 
another.65 However, the Court reasoned that the enumerated list of 
crimes in the statute meant that Congress only intended to include 
similar crimes in the provision and not every crime that threatened to 
injure another.66 The Court then determined that a conviction for a 
DUI differed from burglary, arson, etc. because the latter crimes 
exhibited “purposeful, ‘violent, ‘and ‘aggressive’” behavior while the 
former did not.67 Specifically with regard to the purposeful 
requirement, the Court emphasized: 
 
In this respect . . . crimes involving intentional or purposeful 
conduct (as in burglary and arson) are different than DUI, a 
strict liability crime. In both instances, the offender’s prior 
crimes reveal a degree of callousness toward risk, but in the 
former instance they also show an increased likelihood that 
the offender is the kind of person who might deliberately 
point the gun and pull the trigger. We have no reason to 
believe that Congress intended a 15-year mandatory prison 
term where that increased likelihood does not exist.68 
 
Most recently, the Court decided United States v. Chambers in 
which the Justices considered whether a defendant’s failure to report 
to a penal institution was a violent felony under the ACCA.69 In 
Chambers, the Court dealt with an Illinois statute that criminalized 
several different behaviors in one statute.70 Specifically, the Illinois 
                                                 
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 1584.  
66 Id. at 1584–85.  
67 Id. at 1586 (citations omitted).  
68 Id. at 1587.  
69 129 S. Ct. 687, 690 (2009). 
70 Id. at 691. 
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statute penalized (1) escape from a penal institution; (2) escape from 
the custody of an employee of a penal institution; (3) failing to report 
to a penal institution; (4) failing to report for periodic imprisonment; 
(5) failing to return from furlough; (6) failing to return from work and 
day release; and (7) failing to abide by the terms of home 
confinement.71 
Noting that the categorical approach was not easy to apply in such 
a situation,72 the Court acknowledged that failure to report, as 
identified in parts 3–6 of the statute, was different than the violent 
behavior that usually accompanies an escape attempt.73 Consequently, 
the Justices decided to “treat the statute for ACCA purposes as 
containing at least two separate crimes, namely escape from custody 
on the one hand, and a failure to report on the other.”74 Once the Court 
was able to split the statute, it was fairly easy to decide that simply 
failing to report for confinement was not the type of purposeful, 
aggressive, and violent behavior that Congress intended to target with 
the ACCA.75 
Since Begay, lower courts have struggled to define what is 
“purposeful” under the ACCA or USSG. The easiest cases have been 
when the predicate offense required a mens rea of either purpose or 
knowledge. For example, in United State. v. Smith, the Third Circuit 
held that holding a person in involuntary servitude met the Begay test 
because the statute of conviction criminalized “knowingly . . . 
hold[ing] another in a condition of involuntary servitude.”76 Similarly, 
in United States v. Billups, the Seventh Circuit found that false 
imprisonment was a crime of violence because the Wisconsin statute 
criminalized “intentionally confin[ing] or restrain[ing] another . . . 
                                                 
71 Id. (citing 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/31–6(a) (West 2009)). 
72 Id. at 690.  
73 Id. at 691.  
74 Id. 
75 See id. at 691–92.  
76 284 Fed. App’x 943, 945 (3d Cir. 2008) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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without the person’s consent and with knowledge that he or she had no 
lawful authority to do so.”77 
The more problematic cases have been when there was a mens rea 
of recklessness or the statute made no mention of mens rea, making 
the crime one of strict liability.78 While these cases are discussed in 
more detail below, for now it will suffice to state that courts have 
either inferred that there was purposeful conduct,79 held that there was 
not purposeful conduct,80 or remanded back to the lower court so that 
the defendant’s conduct could be determined.81 
 
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Interpretation of “Purposeful” in Woods 
 
In Woods, the defendant was convicted of two counts of 
distributing ecstasy and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon, 
which were all violations of federal law.82 Woods pled guilty, and the 
Probation Service recommended an enhanced sentence due to (1) 
Wood’s 1993 conviction for possession of cocaine and (2) a 2001 
conviction for involuntary manslaughter.83 In his appeal, Woods 
successfully argued that the involuntary manslaughter conviction was 
not a crime of violence under the Guidelines.84 Importantly, because 
the opinion departed from the Seventh Circuit’s previous approaches 
to the ACCA and USSG, it was circulated to the full court for approval 
before being released.85 
                                                 
77 536 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.30 (West 
2008)) (emphasis added).  
78 See discussion infra Part II.  
79 See, e.g., United States v. Dates, No. 06-0083, 2008 WL 2620162, at *5–6 
(W.D. Pa. Jun. 30, 2008) (holding that simple assault was a crime of violence 
because it was similar to the enumerated offenses and “necessarily” involved 
purposeful conduct).  
80 See, e.g., United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that because the statute of conviction did not specify a mens rea, purposefulness 
could not be shown). 
81 See, e.g., United States v. Roseboro, 551 F.3d 226, 243 (4th Cir. 2009).  
82 United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 401 (7th Cir. 2009). 
83 Id. 
84 See id. at 412–13. 
85 See id. at 407. 
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Judge Diane Wood, who authored the opinion, began her analysis 
by stating that, under the categorical approach, the court was 
precluded from looking into the details of the defendant’s guilty plea 
to determine whether the crime of conviction was a crime of violence 
under the Guidelines.86 Judge Wood emphasized that, while courts 
were permitted to consult additional materials under Shephard, these 
materials could “be used only to determine which crime within a 
statute the defendant committed, not how he committed that crime.”87 
The court then had to determine whether a conviction under 
Illinois’s involuntary manslaughter statute constituted sufficiently 
purposeful, aggressive, and violent behavior that posed a serious risk 
of physical harm to another.88 Illinois’s involuntary manslaughter 
statute read: 
 
A person who unintentionally kills an individual without 
lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his 
acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are 
such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some 
individual, and he performs them recklessly.89  
 
In addition, “recklessness” was defined as: 
 
A person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by 
the statute defining the offense; and such disregard 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which 
a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.90 
 
                                                 
86 Id. at 403–06. 
87 Id. at 405. 
88 Id. at 410. 
89 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9–3(a) (West 2008) (amended 2009). 
90 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4–6 (West 2009). 
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Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit had decided United States v. 
Smith only a year before.91 In Smith, the defendant had two 
convictions for criminal recklessness.92 In considering whether a mens 
rea of recklessness could qualify as a violent felony under Begay, the 
Seventh Circuit focused on the examples the Court used of crimes that 
were not committed by career criminals.93 Specifically, the Seventh 
Circuit noted that the Court used reckless tampering of consumer 
products as an example on an unintentional act.94 Looking at this 
example, the Smith court followed Begay’s reasoning that while 
reckless tampering with consumer products was “unquestionably 
dangerous,” it “was ‘far removed’ from the ‘deliberate kind of 
behavior associated with violent criminal use of firearms.”95 The 
Seventh Circuit also focused on the fact that the Court said all of the 
enumerated offenses (i.e. burglary, arson, etc.) were intentional.96 
Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded in Smith that crimes requiring 
only a mens rea of recklessness cannot be considered violent felonies 
under the ACCA.97  
In response to Smith, the Government in Woods argued that 
Begay did not require that all crimes of recklessness be considered 
non-violent.98 The Government stated that Woods’s involuntary 
manslaughter conviction should count as a crime of violence because 
Woods had to consciously disregard the substantial harm that would 
occur.99 The Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected this argument by 
responding that every reckless act begins with intentional behavior.100 
The court added “when pressed at oral argument to provide an 
example of a situation where a defendant would be reckless with 
                                                 
91 Woods, 576 F.3d at 411; United States v. Smith, 544 F.3d 781, 782 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
92 Smith, 544 F.3d at 782. 
93 Id. at 785.  
94 Id.  
95 Id. (citing Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581, 1587 (7th Cir. 2008)).  
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 787. 
98 United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 411 (7th Cir. 2009). 
99 Id. 
100 Id.  
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regard to the outcome and not begin with an intentional act, the 
Government could not provide one.”101 Accordingly, because 
Illinois’s involuntary manslaughter conviction only prohibited 
homicide, the majority held that Wood’s conviction did not count for 
purposes of sentence enhancement.
reckless 
                                                
102 
In addition, the court explicitly refrained from using a modified 
categorical approach to sentencing.103 The court explained that the 
modified categorical approach only applies when a statute is 
divisible,104 and a statute is only divisible when it “creates several 
crimes or a single crime with several modes of commission.”105 
“Modes of commission” was specifically limited to conduct that was 
explicitly identified in the statute.106 Thus, because Illinois’s 
involuntary manslaughter statute did not specify modes of 
commission, the court did not consider the involuntary manslaughter 
statute to be divisible.107 
Chief Judge Easterbrook, joined by Judges Posner and Tinder, 
wrote a dissent that sharply criticized Begay and he urged the Court to 
create a more concrete list of violent felonies instead of an open-ended 
test.108 Chief Judge Easterbrook reminded the Court that “[s]tates did 
not write their statutes with Begay in mind.”109 He further questioned 
“[h]ow can it be that burglary is a crime of violence, even though 
people are rarely injured in burglaries, and homicide is not, even 
though a person’s death is an element of the offense?”110 
The dissent argued that the lower court should have been able to 
look at the charging documents and consider the defendant’s 
conduct.111 The dissent rationalized this approach in light of the 
 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 413. 





108 See id. at 413 (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting). 
109 Id.  
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categorical approach by arguing that as long as there is some question 
as to what part of a statute the defendant violated, even if that question 
is irrelevant to ultimate guilt (such as the difference between 
burglarizing a house and a boat), the sentencing court should be 
allowed to look at the documents.112 The dissent’s opinion was best 
summed up by the following: 
 
Woods dropped a five-week-old baby on his head, then shook 
the comatose child to death. That is purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive conduct. The possibility that Woods did not intend 
to drop the child need not detain us; the state statute requires 
some knowing conduct, a standard satisfied by the shaking if 
not the dropping. (The state judge did not pin this down, 
because it was not relevant as a matter of state law.) The 
Woods panel concludes that recklessness does not meet 
Begay’s requirement of intentional conduct, but [another 
case] holds that criminal recklessness—the kind involved 
here—is a form of intent, and I think it likely that the Justices 
will deem it sufficient for recidivism enhancements too.113  
 
In contrast to the majority, the dissent focused on the defendant’s 
conduct as opposed to his mens rea.114 The dissent saw Woods’s 
activity as falling within the purposeful, violent, and aggressive 
conduct that the Court meant to target.115  
In contrast to the majority, the dissent stated that the statute of 
conviction did not have to be divisible in order for a modified 
categorical approach to apply.116 The dissent argued that, under 
Taylor, a court should be allowed to consult the charging papers and 
                                                 
112 Id. at 416. 
113 Id. 
114 Compare id. at 410 (majority opinion) with id. at 416 (Easterbrook, C.J., 
dissenting).  
115 See id. at 416 (“[T]he kind [of intent] involved here . . . is a form of intent, 
and I think it likely that the Justices will deem it sufficient for recidivism 
enhancements . . . .” (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)).  
116 See id. at 414.  
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plea colloquy in order to discover whether a defendant burglarized a 
house or a barn, even though such a distinction is irrelevant under the 
generic burglary statute.117 Similarly, how Woods killed his son was 
ultimately irrelevant for conviction under the involuntary 
manslaughter statute, but it could be relevant for purposes of sentence 
enhancement.118 
Furthermore, the dissent advocated for a more flexible approach 
to sentencing under the Guidelines because of their advisory nature.119 
Because the Guidelines were not mandatory, and a judge could have 
therefore imposed a heightened sentence regardless of what the 
Guidelines suggested, the dissent asked: “why employ elaborate rules 
about ‘divisibility’ and ‘recklessness’ that the district judge may elect 
to bypass in the end?”120 
 
II. CAN A MENS REA OF RECKLESSNESS EVER  
BE PURPOSEFUL UNDER BEGAY? 
 
At first glance, it seems crimes requiring a mens rea of 
recklessness would never satisfy the Begay test because acting 
recklessly, by definition, is not the same as acting with intent.121 As 
explained above, that is the view the Seventh Circuit adopted in Smith 
and reaffirmed in Woods.122 However, a circuit split has developed 
with regard to this question. While some circuits have followed 
reasoning similar to that used in Woods, other courts have held that a 
mens rea of recklessness, or even no mens rea at all, is sufficient to 
                                                 
117 Id. at 415 ( “[A] third kind of statute provides that ‘any person who enters a 
building with intent to commit a felony therein’ commits burglary. There’s nothing 
‘divisible’ about that law: the word ‘building’ covers barns, ships, and dwellings. 
Yet Taylor says that here, too, the sentencing judge may look at the charging papers 
or guilty-plea colloquy to see whether the person was convicted of entering a house 
rather than a barn.”).  
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 418.  
120 Id. 
121 Compare 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4–6 (West 2009), with 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4–4 (West 2009).  
122 See discussion supra Part I.C. 
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meet the Begay test.123 In addition, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals adopted a modified categorical approach when confronted 
with a defendant who may have committed his crime recklessly.124  
 
A. Circuits Holding that Recklessness Can Never Meet the  
“Purposeful” Requirement for a Violent Felony Under the ACCA  
or USSG 
 
When considering the Court’s decision in Begay, several circuits 
have held that a predicate offense that has a mens rea of recklessness 
cannot count as a crime of violence.125 For example, in United States 
v. Gray, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a conviction for 
reckless endangerment under New York state law126 did not qualify as 
the type of purposeful, aggressive, conduct that the Court in Begay 
hoped to target.127  
While the Second Circuit acknowledged that behavior sufficient 
to be criminalized as reckless endangerment “com[es] close to 
crossing the threshold into purposeful conduct,”128 the court in Gray 
ultimately concluded that reckless acts could not be considered 
intentional.129 In support of its conclusion, the court stated that “Begay 
places a strong emphasis on intentional-purposeful-conduct as a 
prerequisite for a crime to be considered similar in kind to [burglary, 
arson, extortion, and the use of explosives].”130 Furthermore, the Gray 
court noted that the Court offered the crime of recklessly tampering 
                                                 
123 Compare discussion infra Part II.A with discussion infra Part II.B. 
124 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
125 See United States v. Gray, 535 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Baker, 559 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2009). 
126 The defendant was convicted under New York Penal Law § 120.25 which 
stated that “[a] person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, 
under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly 
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person.” N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 120.25 (2009). 
127 535 F.3d at 131–32.  
128 Id. at 132.  
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 131–32.  
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with consumer products in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1365(a)131 as an 
example of a crime that would not be considered purposeful, 
aggressive, and violent.132  
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that reckless endangerment was 
not a violent felony under the ACCA.133 Post-Begay, the Sixth Circuit 
was forced to reconsider its position that reckless endangerment 
qualified as a violent felony.134 A mere year beforehand, but before 
Begay, the Sixth Circuit had decided United States v. Bailey, in which 
it held that reckless endangerment was a violent felony because it 
posed a serious risk of physical harm to another person.135 The Bailey 
court reasoned that a predicate conviction for reckless endangerment 
should enhance the sentence of a defendant because “no scenario 
exists in which an individual could commit felony reckless 
endangerment without creating a serious risk of harm to 
others . . . .”136 
However, in United States v. Baker, the Sixth Circuit 
reconsidered its holding in light of Begay and held that reckless 
endangerment did not qualify as a violent felony.137 The court held 
that Begay stood for the proposition that the residual clause of the 
ACCA and USSG only applied to crimes that were similar to burglary 
and arson instead of every crime that presented a serious potential risk 
of physical injury to another.138 Accordingly, while the Sixth Circuit 
was willing to admit that reckless endangerment posed a serious risk, 
it ultimately concluded that the crime was not purposeful and thus not 
a violent felony.139 The court stated that “the offense does not involve 
                                                 
131 A person is guilty of violating this statute if he recklessly “disregard[s] . . . 
the risk that another person will be placed in danger of death or bodily injury and 
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to such risk, tampers with any 
consumer product.” 18 U.S.C. § 1356(a) (2006). 
132 Gray, 535 F.3d at 132 n.3.  
133 See United States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443, 452 (6th Cir. 2009).  
134 Id.  
135 264 Fed. App’x 480, 482 (6th Cir. 2008).  
136 Id. 
137 Baker, 559 F.3d at 453.  
138 Id. at 452.  
139 Id. at 453.  
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the type of ‘purposeful, violent, and aggressive’ conduct as burglary, 
arson, extortion, or the use of explosives . . . . Rather, on its face the 
statute criminalizes only reckless behavior.”140 
While neither the Second Circuit nor the Sixth Circuit explicitly 
stated that a mens rea of recklessness could never meet the Begay 
standard, the reasoning utilized above strongly suggested that a 
criminal statute with only a mens rea of recklessness or negligence 
was unlikely to count for purposes of sentence enhancement under the 
ACCA and the USSG in those circuits. Furthermore, courts 
interpreting these decisions from the Second, Sixth, and Seventh 
Circuits have recognized the intentional/purposeful mens rea 
requirement for triggering sentence enhancements under the ACCA 
and USSG.141 Thus, the mens rea of a statute may be the most defining 
element when determining whether a statute is a violent felony under 
the ACCA or USSG.142  
 
B. Circuits Holding that a Mens Rea of Recklessness or Strict  
Liability Crimes Do Satisfy the “Purposeful” Requirement of Begay 
 
At the other end of the spectrum are those circuits holding that a 
mens rea of recklessness or crimes without a specified mens rea can be 
sufficiently purposeful to constitute a violent felony under the ACCA 
and the USSG.143 These circuits mainly rely upon the fact that there is 
                                                 
140 Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).  
141 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 574 F.3d 546, 551 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Jones 
is correct in asserting that some circuits have interpreted Begay to limit the mens rea 
a crime must have in order to qualify as a violent felony.” (citing United States v. 
Smith, 544 F.3d 781, 785–86 (7th Cir.2008) (holding that post-Begay crimes of 
recklessness are not violent felonies under the ACCA); United States v. Gray, 535 
F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir.2008) (holding that "reckless endangerment" is not a crime of 
violence because the statute “on its face does not criminalize intentional or deliberate 
conduct."))). 
142 See id. 
143 See United States v. Zuniga, 553 F.3d 1330, 1336 (10th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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some intentional or purposeful act that occurs during the commission 
of the crime.144  
For example, in United States v. Zuniga, the Tenth Circuit held 
that possession of a deadly weapon in prison145 constituted a violent 
felony under the ACCA.146 The Tenth Circuit immediately noticed 
that the statute criminalized reckless conduct and, as a res
acknowledged that the defendant’s possession of a deadly weapon did 
not have to be deliberate or intentional under the statute.
ult, 
                                                
147 The court 
then stated that “the Begay test specifically requires that the crime in 
question ‘typically’ involve purposeful conduct. It is reasonable to 
surmise that those who possess deadly weapons in a penal institution 
typically intend to possess them.”148 The Zuniga court also examined 
how the state courts interpreted the Texas statute.149 Noting that one of 
the elements the State had to show was that the accused “possessed the 
weapon knowingly or intentionally,” the court had an easier time 
concluding that a conviction for possessing a deadly weapon in prison 
qualified as a violent felony.150 
In Zuniga, the Tenth Circuit also justified its opinion based on its 
conclusion that possessing a deadly weapon was more similar to 




144 Id.  
145 See TEX PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.10 (West 2003) (“A person commits an 
offense if, while in a penal institution, he (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly: 
(1) carries on or about his person a deadly weapon; or (2) possesses or conceals a 
deadly weapon in a penal institution.”).  
146 553 F.3d at 1336.  
147 Id. at 1334.  
148 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 1334–35 (citing Wilson v. State of Texas, No. 13-04-00298-CR, 2007 
Tex. App. LEXIS 4332, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. 13th Dist. May 31, 2007) 
(unpublished)). Of course, while the Tenth Circuit relied on this opinion in its 
decision, it should be noted that Wilson was unpublished and not binding on any 
state court. 
151 Id. at 1335. 
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The Court in Begay determined that driving under the 
influence was not a purposeful crime because it was similar 
to a strict liability offense, ‘criminalizing conduct in respect 
to which the offender need not have any criminal intent at 
all.’ Possession of a deadly weapon in prison is not a strict 
liability crime, because it requires either intentional or 
reckless behavior. In terms of purpose, it is therefore not 
analogous to driving under the influence.152 
 
In a very similar case, the Third Circuit also concluded that 
possession of a deadly weapon was purposeful.153 Interestingly, the 
statute the defendant was convicted under, 18 U.S.C. §1791(a)(2), was 
a strict liability offense and had no mens rea requirement.154 
Specifically, 18 U.S.C. §1791(a)(2) provided that “[w]hoever . . . 
being an inmate of a prison, makes, possesses, or obtains, or attempts 
to make or obtain, a prohibited object shall be punished as provided in 
subsection (b) of this section.”155 In other words, one could 
theoretically be convicted under this statute for negligently or 
recklessly possessing a prohibited object (not even a necessarily a 
deadly object, just one that is prohibited).156 In looking at the 
“purposeful” component of the Begay test, the Third Circuit 
summarily declared that “[w]hile possessing a weapon in prison is 
purposeful, in that we may assume one who possesses a shank intends 
that possession, it cannot properly be characterized as conduct that is 
itself aggressive or violent.”157 Thus, while the Tenth and Third 
Circuits similarly found that possessing a weapon in prison was 
purposeful, they differ with regard to whether that possession was 
aggressive and/or violent.158 
 
                                                 
152 Id. (internal citations omitted).  
153 United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 2009).  
154 See 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2) (2006).  
155 Id. 
156 See id.  
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C. Recklessness May Qualify as Purposefulness:  
The Modified Categorical Approach 
 
A frequent problem courts encounter when sentencing a 
defendant under the ACCA or Guidelines is when a defendant can be 
convicted under a statute for acting purposefully or recklessly.159 The 
Fourth Circuit was faced with just such a dilemma in U.S. v. 
Roseboro.160  
In Roseboro, the predicate felony at issue was failure to stop for a 
blue light.161 The statute at issue criminalized the “failure” to stop for 
a blue light but did not specify a particular mens rea.162 Specifically, 
the statute stated: 
 
In the absence of mitigating circumstances, it is unlawful for 
a motor vehicle driver, while driving on a road, street, or 
highway of the State, to fail to stop when signaled by a law 
enforcement vehicle by means of a siren or flashing light. An 
attempt to increase the speed of a vehicle or in other manner 
avoid the pursuing law enforcement vehicle when signaled by 
a siren or flashing light is prima facie evidence of a violation 
of this section. Failure to see the flashing light or hear the 
siren does not excuse a failure to stop when the distance 
between the vehicles and other road conditions are such that 
it would be reasonable for a driver to hear or see the signals 
from the law enforcement vehicle.163 
 
The Fourth Circuit held that the wording of the statute placed the 
sentencing court in a dilemma, because a defendant could intentionally 
or unintentionally violate the statute.164 Noting that the statute was 
“categorically overbroad” the court remanded to the district court and 
                                                 
159 See, e.g., United States v. Roseboro, 551 F.3d 226, 235 (4th Cir. 2009). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 228.  
162 Id. at 234–35.  
163 S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-6-750 (West 2009).  
164 Roseboro, 551 F.3d at 234–35.  
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allowed the court to consult additional materials to discover whether 
the defendant had acted intentionally.165  
Thus, in Roseboro, the court took a statute that was “strict-
liability like” in nature and, instead of determining that the conduct 
was not purposeful, remanded the case to allow the district court to 
determine whether the defendant’s conduct was intentional.166  
 
III. IN ORDER TO FULFILL THE GOALS OF THE ACCA AND  
THE USSG, JUDGES NEED MORE DISCRETION TO DETERMINE 
PURPOSEFULNESS 
 
As explained above, one of the major goals of the ACCA was to 
keep violent, repeat offenders off the streets.167 The Guidelines have 
the additional aspiration of trying to maintain uniformity in 
sentencing.168 A mens rea approach does not best fulfill these goals. 
On the other hand, the Tenth and Third Circuit’s approach is 
insufficient because it potentially allows non-purposeful conduct to be 
elevated to the level of a violent felony. Instead, judges should be 
allowed more discretion to look at the record and determine whether 
the conduct at issue demonstrates that the defendant intended to act in 
a violent and aggressive manner. Thus, courts should use, and should 
be allowed to use, the modified categorical approach suggested by the 
court in Roseboro and the dissent in Woods.  
 
A. The Mens Rea Approach is Unsatisfactory 
Limiting violent felonies to only those crimes that require a mens 
rea of recklessness does not accomplish Congress’s goals of (1) 
neutralizing violent, repeat offenders and (2) achieving uniformity in 
sentencing.  
 
                                                 
165 Id. at 240. 
166 Id. 
167 See discussion supra Part I.A.  
168 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
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1. Too Many Offenses Are Left Out of the Definition of Violent  
Felony, Thus Working Against the Goal of Punishing Serial Offenders 
 
Considering that one of the major goals of Congress in enacting 
the ACCA and creating the Sentencing Commission was to neutralize 
violent repeat offenders, the mens rea approach is unable to achieve 
this goal. Specifically, two of the most heinous crimes, manslaughter 
and sexual assault might not qualify as violent felonies or crimes of 
violence under the Seventh Circuit’s mens rea approach.169 Thus, an 
individual who commits any combination of involuntary manslaughter 
and sexual assault multiple times might still not be considered a career 
offender under the ACCA or USSG.170  
Looking first at involuntary manslaughter, the Seventh Circuit’s 
holding in Woods asserts that involuntary manslaughter is not a violent 
felony.171 However, such a holding is directly in conflict with the 
position of the Sentencing Commission, which has included 
manslaughter on its list of enumerated predicate felonies.172 As the 
Commission was created, in part, as a response to Congress’s desire to 
incapacitate serious offenders, the Commission’s position on what 
crimes are violent felonies is persuasive.173 The Seventh Circuit’s 
                                                 
169 See United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 412–13 (7th Cir. 2009); 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12–13 (West 2009). As explained in Part I.C, the Seventh 
Circuit held that involuntary manslaughter under Illinois law does not qualify as a 
violent felony under Begay. See discussion supra Part I.C. Further, Illinois’s 
criminal sexual assault statute does not specify a mens rea, and thus is a strict 
liability offense, so a conviction under the statute would not be purposeful under a 
mens rea approach. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.  
170 See id. 
171 Woods, 576 F.3d at 412–13; see discussion supra Part I.C.  
172 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) cmt. n.1 (2009). 
173 See United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2008) (“We note that 
the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) includes manslaughter as a crime of violence 
without distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, arguably 
suggesting that the mens rea for the crime is not determinative.”); see also United 
States v. Camilo, 71 F.3d 984, 988 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing to the Commission’s 
commentary to support its position); United States v. Wilson, 993 F.2d 214, 217 
(11th Cir. 1993) (citing commentary from the Commission to support its holding that 
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mens rea approach, in leading to an opposite result, does not fulfill the 
goals of the ACCA and the USSG.   
 Arguably, a distinction could be drawn between voluntary and 
involuntary manslaughter. For example, when considering a bill that 
would impose mandatory life imprisonment for individuals convicted 
of three violent felonies, the House of Representatives proposed that 
the term “serious violent felony” meant “[a] Federal or State offense, 
by whatever designation and wherever committed, consisting of . . . 
manslaughter other than involuntary manslaughter.”174 
However, even in taking this definition into account, there are 
important considerations to keep in mind. First, the Commission did 
not make the distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
manslaughter.175 Second, the definition above is for a “serious violent 
felony” as opposed to a “violent felony,” and the ACCA only concerns 
itself with violent felonies.176 Consequently, there is no indication that 
Congress meant to remove involuntary manslaughter from the list of 
violent felonies simply because it was committed recklessly.  
Similarly, some sex crimes will likely not be considered 
“purposeful” under the mens rea approach because these crimes do not 
specify a mens rea.177 Criminal Sexual Assault, for example, is 
defined in Illinois as: 
                                                                                                                  
 
§ 12-13. Criminal Sexual Assault. 
(a) The accused commits criminal sexual assault if he or she: 
(1) commits an act of sexual penetration by the use of force 
or threat of force; or  
 
reasonably foreseeable consequences of fraud can be taken into account when 
sentencing).  
174 H.R. REP. NO. 103–463, at 2 (1994).  
175 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) cmt. n.1 (2009). 
176 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006). 
177 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12–13 (West 2009); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/12–14.1 (West 2009). But see United States v. Patterson, 576 F.3d 431, 442 
(7th Cir. 2009) (holding that knowingly transporting a minor across state lines for 
prostitution is a crime of violence).  
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(2) commits an act of sexual penetration and the accused 
knew that the victim was unable to understand the nature of 
the act or was unable to give knowing consent; or  
(3) commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who 
was under 18 years of age when the act was committed and 
the accused was a family member; or  
(4) commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who 
was at least 13 years of age but under 18 years of age when 
the act was committed and the accused was 17 years of age or 
over and held a position of trust, authority or supervision in 
relation to the victim.178  
 
Of the various definitions, only one, §12-13(a)(2) has a mens rea 
element to it.179 According to Woods, while a court could engage in a 
modified categorical approach to discover what offense the defendant 
committed, the court could not take the facts learned from the record 
of conviction to determine whether the defendant acted 
purposefully.180 Instead, the court would be restricted to the statutory 
language.181 Thus if a defendant committed (a)(1)—sexual penetration 
by the use of force or threat of force—the court could not determine 
whether he had acted purposefully because there is no mens rea 
element. The statute, in fact, reads like a strict liability statute. As a 
result, the Seventh Circuit would be precluded from determining that a 
defendant had acted purposefully, and thus the rapist would not be 
subjected to an enhanced sentence—even if he was to rape two more 
times.182  
                                                 
178 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12–13 (West 2009). 
179 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12–13(a)(2) (West 2009) (“the accused 
knew”). 
180 See United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 2009).  
181 See id. 
182 In both Woods and Patterson, the Seventh Circuit used the strict liability 
statute at issue in Begay to point out that the Supreme Court did not intend to 
enhance sentences for those crimes where the offender did not act with criminal 
intent. See id. at 409; Patterson, 576 F.3d at 441. Thus, while the Seventh Circuit 
has never explicitly held that strict liability statutes do not meet the Begay test, such 
a holding can be inferred from the court’s reasoning in Woods and Patterson.  
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 Predatory criminal sexual assault of a child functions in a 
similar way. The statute reads: 
 
§ 12-14.1. Predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. 
(a) The accused commits predatory criminal sexual assault of 
a child if: 
(1) the accused was 17 years of age or over and commits an 
act of sexual penetration with a victim who was under 13 
years of age when the act was committed; or  
(1.1) the accused was 17 years of age or over and, while 
armed with a firearm, commits an act of sexual penetration 
with a victim who was under 13 years of age when the act 
was committed; or  
(1.2) the accused was 17 years of age or over and commits an 
act of sexual penetration with a victim who was under 13 
years of age when the act was committed and, during the 
commission of the offense, the accused personally discharged 
a firearm; or  
(2) the accused was 17 years of age or over and commits an 
act of sexual penetration with a victim who was under 13 
years of age when the act was committed and the accused 
caused great bodily harm to the victim that:  
(A) resulted in permanent disability; or  
(B) was life threatening; or  
(3) the accused was 17 years of age or over and commits an 
act of sexual penetration with a victim who was under 13 
years of age when the act was committed and the accused 
delivered (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of 
possession, or any other means) to the victim without his or 
her consent, or by threat or deception, and for other than 
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Again, a review of the statute finds no mens rea element.183 
Because no criminal intent is specified in this statute, and any of these 
offenses could theoretically be committed purposefully, knowingly, or 
recklessly, the Seventh Circuit would be precluded from finding any 
of these offenses to be crimes of violence.184  
Accordingly, the mens rea approach fails to impose larger 
sentences on those individuals who commit some of the more 
disturbing crimes: homicide (in the form of involuntary manslaughter) 
and criminal sexual assault. Such a result seems inconsistent with the 
goals of the ACCA and USSG, and is in direct opposition to the 
Commission’s intent.185  
 
2. A Mens Rea Approach Creates a Lack of Uniformity 
 
The other articulated goal of Congress in creating the 
Commission was to achieve uniformity in sentencing.186 However, 
under a mens rea approach, defendants with similar levels of 
culpability end up with widely disparate sentences.  
Two cases, United States v. Woods and United States v. Hudson, 
illustrate this dilemma. As discussed in Part I, the defendant in Woods 
was convicted of involuntary manslaughter after recklessly shaking his 
disabled infant son and causing his death.187 Although irrelevant for 
our purposes, there was other evidence that the baby had been abused 
and had died from blunt trauma to the head.188  
In Hudson, one of the defendant’s predicate offenses was fleeing 
a police officer.189 Specifically, Hudson was guilty of fleeing “while 
                                                 
183 The Model Penal Code identifies four levels of culpability: purpose, 
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (2009). 
None of these levels of culpability are identified in the statute.  
184 See supra note 182 and accompanying text; see also MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.02(3) (2009) (stating that if a statute does not specify a mens rea, a defendant is 
guilty of the offense if he commits it purposely, knowingly, or recklessly).   
185 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) cmt. n.1 (2009). 
186 See discussion supra Part I.B.  
187 See discussion supra Part I.C. 
188 United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 402 (7th Cir. 2009).  
189 United States v. Hudson, 577 F.3d 883, 884 (8th Cir. 2009).  
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operating a motor vehicle on city streets ‘at excessive speeds and 
failing to stop for stop signs.’”190 Later, the defendant was also 
convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm.191 He argued that 
he was not subject to the sentence enhancement because his prior 
conviction for fleeing a police officer was not a crime of violence.192 
Specifically, he argued that the statute of conviction did not require an 
intent to kill or harm, and, as a result, did not require 
purposefulness.193 In other words, Hudson argued that his behavior 
was not purposeful because he did not intend to expose anyone to 
harm.194 
The Eighth Circuit disagreed.195 In looking at the statute of 
conviction, the court noted that Hudson was charged with knowingly 
fleeing a police officer.196 Accordingly, the court concluded that 
“knowingly fleeing a police officer who is attempting to make an 
arrest is purposeful conduct that falls within the ‘otherwise involves’ 
clause of § 4B1.2(a) as construed by Begay.”197 Consequently, by 
looking only at the mens rea of the statute of conviction, Hudson was 
given an additional fifteen-year sentence for knowingly fleeing a 
police office when his actual conduct may not have presented a 
“serious potential risk of injury to another.”198  
The differing results in Woods and Hudson appear anomalous. 
Both Woods and Hudson consciously engaged in an act that 
represented a callous indifference toward human life. Surely, one 
defendant is not more likely to point a gun and pull a trigger than the 
other. Yet Hudson was sentenced to an additional fifteen years, while 
Woods was not. This is especially alarming in light of the fact that 
Woods’s action actually did claim a human life while Hudson’s did 
not.  
                                                 
190 Id.  
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 885–86.  
194 See id. 
195 Id. at 886.  
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2009).  
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 The different results in Hudson and Woods demonstrate that a 
mens rea approach to purposefulness goes against the goal of 
uniformity in sentencing. Arguably, uniformity is only a goal with 
regard to two defendants who are convicted of the same crime, but the 
goals of the Commission state that the Commission is charged with 
ensuring certainty in sentencing with regard to similar defendants who 
have a similar criminal background.199 Since the mens rea approach 
concentrates solely on the mens rea required for conviction without 
taking into account any of the background facts of a case, such an 
approach creates severe disparities in sentencing between similarly-
situated defendants.  
 
B. The Tenth Circuit’s Approach is Inconsistent with Begay 
 
Even as the Seventh Circuit’s approach is too narrow, the Tenth 
Circuit’s rule is too broad. As stated above, the Tenth Circuit found 
purposefulness when the statute of conviction criminalized behavior 
that was “typically” committed with purpose.200 However, this 
overlooks the fact that some defendants could be convicted who did 
not intentionally engage in any aggressive or violent behavior.  
A simple hypothetical demonstrates this point. If Joe Inmate 
believes that someone is waiting for him in the cafeteria, he may bring 
a sharpened toothbrush with him to defend himself. Nothing, in fact, 
happens, and Joe means to get rid of the weapon, but he forgets that he 
has it on his person. Later, during a routine search, guards discover the 
toothbrush. While Joe did not intend to have the weapon on him at the 
time he was caught, his offense would still be considered a violent 
felony under the ACCA.  
Of course, it could be argued that the inmate intended to possess 
the weapon earlier, or that he committed an intentional act that lead to 
him recklessly committing a crime. However, the Seventh Circuit’s 
response to this argument is sound. In essence, the Seventh Circuit 
recognized that every unintentional act begins with an intentional 
                                                 
199 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b)(1)(B) (West 2008). 
200 United States v. Zuniga, 553 F.3d 1330, 1334 (10th Cir. 2009).  
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act.201 The Tenth Circuit’s approach thus impermissibly blurs the line 
between actus reus and mens rea.202 By finding that the purposefulness 
requirement is met in one intentional act, such a holding relieves the 
court of finding purpose with regard to the actual crime of conviction. 
In addition, punishing those individuals who do not have the 
requisite level of intent is contrary to the Court’s holding in Begay.203 
Specifically, the Court in Begay was concerned about those 
individuals who might “deliberately point the gun and pull the 
trigger.”204 Indeed, one of the Court’s problems with New Mexico’s 
DUI statute in Begay was that it would add a 15-year sentence 
enhancement as a result of a crime where the defendant did not need to 
have any criminal intent whatsoever.205 Therefore, in cases where a 
defendant could be convicted without having intentionally committed 
the offense, the Tenth Circuit’s approach goes against the holding of 
Begay.  
 
C. The Modified Categorical Approach:  
(Re)Introducing Discretion into Sentencing 
 
On the surface, it is difficult to construe “recklessness” as 
“purposefulness” because, as the court addressed in Woods, every 
reckless result likely begins with an intentional act.206 Yet, looking 
solely at the mens rea of a statute creates unjust results that go against 
the established purposes of sentencing.207 How is one to reconcile 
these results? 
                                                 
201 See United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 410–11 (7th Cir. 2009).  
202 See Michael M. O’Hear, Seventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week: What 
Is a Crime of Violence?, MARQ. U. L. SCH. FACULTY BLOG, Aug. 9, 2009, 
http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2009/08/09/seventh-circuit-criminal-case-of-
the-week-what-is-a-crime-of-violence. 
203 See Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581, 1587 (2008).  
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 1586–87. 
206 See United States v. Woods, 476 F.3d 400, 411 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Every 
crime of recklessness necessarily requires a purposeful, volitional act that sets in 
motion the later outcome.”).  
207 See discussion supra Part III.A.  
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Adherence to the categorical approach causes unjust and disparate 
results in sentencing. While there are understandable reasons why 
society does not want judges to be able to comb through a defendant’s 
record when imposing a sentence, by not allowing judges any access 
to the record of conviction it is virtually impossible to separate the 
violent, career offenders from the “regular” repeat offenders.208  
Under current Court precedent, the best approach so far seems to 
be the Fourth Circuit’s approach in Roseboro. In Roseboro, the Fourth 
Circuit took a statute that did not specify a mens rea requirement, and 
remanded the case back to the lower court to determine whether the 
defendant had acted with purpose. This approach is preferable to either 
the mens rea approach or the Tenth Circuit’s approach. With regard to 
the sexual assault statutes described above, such an approach would 
allow a sentencing judge to look at certain documents in the record to 
determine whether a defendant acted purposefully.209 Instead of 
simply not allowing these crimes to count as predicate offenses, the 
modified categorical approach will allow a more just and uniform 
sentencing because defendants with similar degrees of guilt will 
receive similar punishments.210  
The modified categorical approach could have lead to a different 
result in Woods. Although the statute criminalized only reckless intent, 
Wood’s conduct demonstrates an intent to commit a violent and 
aggressive act.211 As the dissent explained, “[l]ikewise a person who 
drops a baby on his head, and intentionally shakes the inert body 
violently, has committed an aggressive and dangerous act; the person's 
                                                 
208 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) for a discussion of possible Sixth Amendment 
concerns when judges use discretion in sentencing. However, Apprendi and its 
progeny are not of concern because both of those cases dealt with judicial findings of 
fact. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300. A modified categorical 
approach to sentencing would only use facts that have already been found by a jury 
or have been admitted to by a defendant. See Woods, 576 F.3d at 415 (Easterbrook, 
C.J., dissenting) (“Shepard blocks using anything other than the charging papers and 
plea colloquy to establish what the defendant was convicted of.”). 
209 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.  
210 See discussion supra Part III.A.  
211 See Woods, 576 F.3d at 417 (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting).  
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indifference to consequences should not prevent counting the 
conviction.”212 Similarly, an individual who recklessly shoots a gun 
into a crowd, but does not intend to kill anyone, intentionally 
committed a violent and aggressive act even though she was 
unconcerned about the consequences of her act.213  
Arguably, the modified categorical approach represents a return 
to the “medical” model of sentencing because judges are allowed 
discretion to determine whether defendants acted purposefully.214 
Indeed, some have called for a return to some form of wholly 
discretionary sentencing.215 However, this article does not call for a 
return to unfettered discretion. Instead, implementing a modified 
categorical approach would alleviate concerns about disparate 
sentencing while furthering the goals of the ACCA and USSG.  
First, the modified categorical approach would not lead to 
disparate sentencing. The Guidelines would still be in place so that 
individuals convicted of a certain crimes would receive the original 
sentence they would normally receive under the Guidelines.216 The 
only provision that would be affected would be the sentence 
enhancement provision.217 To the degree that judges do have more 
discretion to award sentence enhancements, such discretion is 
necessary to fulfill the articulated goals of the ACCA and USSG.  
Furthermore, Congress never meant to entirely eradicate judicial 
discretion in sentencing.218 In fact, “the drafters of the Guidelines 
                                                 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 See discussion supra Part I.B for a discussion on the medical model of 
sentencing.  
215 See Adam Lamparello, Implementing the Heartland Departure in a Post-
Booker World, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 133, 137 (2005).  
216 The Application Instructions instruct district courts to calculate a 
defendant’s sentence, then apply the sentence enhancement. See U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(f) (2009);Woods, 576 F.3d at 411 (“It is worth 
underscoring . . . that the enhanced sentencing range under the ACCA or the career 
offender guidelines is imposed in addition to any punishment that has already been 
imposed on a defendant.” (emphasis in original)).    
217 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (2009). 
218 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 77 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 
3260 (stating that judges were to consider all the purposes of sentencing when 
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regime envisioned an important role for judges . . . . As judges applied 
the Guidelines, they were supposed to highlight issues and concerns 
that the Guidelines had not addressed, in effect, to create a common 
law of sentencing in the interstices of the Guidelines.”219 Additionally, 
the Guidelines themselves allow a sentencing judge to consider any 
other policies or factors that would allow them to adjust the 
defendant’s sentence.220 Therefore, because discretion has always 
been, and continues to be, an integral part of sentencing, the modified 
categorical approach should not be rejected simply because it allows 
more discretion than the mens rea approach.   
Second, the modified categorical approach is more in line with 
Congress’s intent. Congress meant to target repeat, violent 
offenders.221 Shaking a baby to death is certainly violent.222 Congress 
also wanted to achieve greater uniformity in sentencing, and the 
modified categorical approach, more than a mens rea approach, allows 
for defendants with similar degrees of culpability to receive similar 
punishments.223 Instead being confined to the mens rea of a statute, 
courts will be able to reach a common sense decision as to whether the 
defendant acted purposefully. Thus, instead of two wildly different 
results for defendants who engaged in equally culpable behavior, 
courts can determine, for example, that in this involuntary 
manslaughter case, the defendant purposefully committed a violent 
and aggressive act, although she was reckless with regard to the 
eventual outcome.  
CONCLUSION 
Manslaughter, voluntary or involuntary, results in the loss of a 
human life. Woods admitted to dropping his mentally handicapped 
                                                                                                                   
imposing a sentence); United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 372–73 (D. Mass. 
2005).  
219 Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 373.  
220 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 1B1.1(i) (2009).  
221 See discussion supra Part I.A.  
222 See United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 416 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting).  
223 See discussion supra Part II.B; see also discussion supra Part III.A.2.  
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five-week old son and shaking him to death. As the dissent in Woods 
realized, this, by its nature is an intentional, aggressive, and violent 
act.224 Ironically, by getting caught up in the mens rea of the actual 
statute of conviction, courts lose the ability to target repeat offenders 
who have the same level of mental culpability.  
 
                                                 
224 See Woods, 576 F.3d at 416 (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting). 
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